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I.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc.1 and in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co.,2 pose the question contained in the title of this article.
In the Kor's case, plaintiff, a neighborhood retail store brought action
against the defendant, a chain department store, which had induced
certain national manufacturers and their distributors to discontinue
selling to plaintiff. The Radiant Burners case involved an association
which awarded its seal of approval to gas burners passing its tests. At
the behest of some of its members, the association withheld its ap-
proval of plaintiff's burners, and two of the gas-distributing defend-
ants refused to service plaintiff's burners, thus effectively excluding
them from the market. In both cases, the district court' and the
court of appeals4 held that the complaints involved "purely private
quarrels" and did not establish a "public wrong proscribed by the
Sherman Act." On this conceptual premise, both plaintiffs were
denied protection against an obviously illegal act. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to consider this important question in the admin-
istration of the Sherman Act." Reversing the lower courts, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the doctrine that "group boycotts or con-
certed refusals to deal with other traders have long been held to be
in the forbidden category" and that they are not "saved by allegations
that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances,"5 because
they have "by their 'nature' and 'character' a 'monopolistic tend-
ency.' O Although one may not quarrel with the result, the theory on
which it depends is questionable. Every boycott does not have such
a "monopolistic tendency." Analytically, boycott does not even be-
long in either of the categories which are, per se or under special
circumstances, considered violations of the antitrust laws.
* Author, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks (2d ed. 1950, Supp.
1961), 5 vols.; Member of the law firm of Greene, Callmann & Durr, New York.
1 KIor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), reversing 255
F.2d 214 (9th Cir., 1958).
2 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961),
reversing 273 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1959).
3 Not reported.
4 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958); 273 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1959).
5 Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra note 1, at 212.
1 Id. at 213.
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Per se violations are those which by their nature or character
have under all circumstances a "monopolistic tendency." Illustrative
are loose combinations or agreements for price fixing, production
control or division of markets. These necessarily involve restraints
of competition and are what international trade labels a cartel or
cartel-like agreement. We may call them peaceful agreements be-
tween competitors with respect to their competitive relations.7
They may also be close combinations, such as consolidations
and mergers, which though illegal in principle, may nonetheless be
permissible if they do not affect the competitive structure of an in-
dustry. There may even be combinations with noncompetitors either
by way of vertical integration or horizontal combination.
Then there are activities which are part of the fabric of economic
life, such as exclusive dealing agreements, patent license agreements,
etc., which, though otherwise reasonable, may be tainted when "ac-
companied with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint."8
Boycott does not fit into the per se classification. True, there are
boycotts which warrant the invocation of the antitrust laws. Thus,
injunctions have been directed against wholesalers who combined to
prevent manufacturers from selling directly to consumers or re-
tailers,9 co-operative retail associations,' wholesalers who also sold
at retail," chain stores,'2 and a wholesaling company operating as
purchasing exchange.3 Combinations between laundry companies and
7 Callmann, "Patent License Agreements Between Competitors and the Monopoly
Issue," 28 Geo. L.J. 871 (1940).
8 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
9 Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F.2d 866
(8th Cir. 1927), cert. den., 275 U.S. 533 (1927); See also, United States v. Southern
Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 207 Fed. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1913); Wholesale Dry Goods
Institute v. Federal Trade Commission, 139 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. den., 321
U.S. 770 (1944); Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 F.2d
457 (9th Cir. 1925), aff'd, 273 U.S. 52 (1927); In re Grocery Distributors Ass'n of
Northern California, Federal Trade Commission (Dkt. No. 5177, 1948); Note, 97 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 133 (1948).
10 Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F.2d 866
(8th Cir. 1927), cert. den., 275 U.S. 533 (1927); Southern Hardware jobbers' Ass'n v.
Federal Trade Commission, 290 Fed. 773 (Sth Cir. 1923).
11 Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 Fed. 657 (5th Cir.,
1922); National Harness Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 268 Fed.
705 (6th Cir. 1920).
12 United States v. Southern California Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 7 F.2d 944 (S.D.
Cal. 1925).
13 Western Sugar Refinery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 275 Fed. 725 (9th
Cir. 1921).
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labor unions against the so-called "bobtails,"' 4 conspiracies between
manufacturers and dealers to discriminate against catalogue houses,
"upstair houses," sub-jobbers, undesirable or "unlicensed" retailers,
and the like, 5 conspiracies between manufacturers, dealers and union
workers to boycott manufacturers of nonunion-made articles who were
paying lower wages and, consequently, could undersell them,16 con-
spiracies between local manufacturers, dealers and trade unions to
restrain out-of-state manufacturers from shipping and selling within
the local area,1 7 and combinations formed by retailers to prevent
wholesalers,' 8 manufacturers, wholesale dealers, brokers or commission
men from selling directly to consumers, have likewise been enjoined. 9
In the Sugar Institute case20 the boycott directed against one firm's
merger of brokerage and warehousing functions was held unlawful
not only because its real purpose was to preserve a uniformity of
price but also because of the rigorous method of enforcement.2'
However, there are equally as many types of boycott which do
not fall within the proverbial categories of the antitrust laws; for
instance, when a trade association or similar group institutes a boy-
cott against those who allegedly commit unfair practices, such as
"design piracy," how can it be said that such a boycott by its nature
or character has a monopolistic tendency? It was not designed to re-
strain lawful competition or to achieve market control. Nor does it
14 Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers' Union, Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14
A.2d 438 (1940).
15 United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Such
a boycott was held "prima facie unlawful," referring to Fashion Originators' Guild v.
Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See also United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 321 U.S. 707 (1944);
Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 139 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.
1943).
16 United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926) (indictment for violation of the
antitrust laws).
17 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and joiners of America v. United States, 330
U.S. 395 (1947).
18 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1915). See also, Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. State, 95 Miss. 337, 48 So. 1021, 1054
(1909), aff'd, 217 U.S. 433 (1910); saying that defendant's purpose was not confined
to the prevention of unfair competition but extended to any and all competition; State
v. Adams Lumber Co., 81 Neb. 392, 116 N.W. 302 (1908).
19 Granada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910), affirming, 95 1fiss. 337,
48 So. 1021 (1909); United States v. Hollis, 246 Fed. 611 (D.C.D. Minn. 1917);
United States v. National Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 448 (Colo. 1941).
20 Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), affirming Judge Mack's
famous opinion in 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
21 For instance, a rehearing after the Institute had made its finding could be had
only upon the request of an Institute member, not the disqualified intermediary.
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reflect any of the essential elements of restraints such as price fixing,
production control, division of markets, etc.2s For the same reasons,
the boycotts involved in the Klor's and Oilburner cases were probably
not motivated by any desire for monopolistic control; it could hardly
be said that the defendants in those cases were seeking to dominate
the market. As the District Court held, only "private quarrels" were
involved. But that conclusion does not resolve the issue.
If such a boycott is nevertheless illegal per se-and of course it
is-the rationale must be found elsewhere. Why stretch the antitrust
laws to reach a desired result, when other doctrines are not only avail-
able but more and more apposite? It seems unrealistic to require a
plaintiff, who is basically involved in a private quarrel with a compet-
itor, to allege public injury or facts from which such injury can be
inferred, such as increase in prices to the consuming public, diminution
in the volume, or deterioration in the quality, of the merchandise in
the competitive market and the like. It is puzzling, indeed, why the
courts were so entranced by the antitrust laws. Why did they ignore
tortious or even malicious interference with business relations, or
"trespass upon the property" of a "going concern"--in short, unfair
competition? 23 Invoking the antitrust laws to decide a pure case of
unfair competition is like shooting squirrels with elephant guns!
In light of the precedents, the courts were following tradition. In
Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co.,24 the defendant, who operated a
sawmill, had no competition until the plaintiff established a rival
business. To drive the plaintiff out of business, defendant intimidated
plaintiff's suppliers and customers. Defendant's acts were held jus-
tified on the theory that they were prompted by purely competitive
purposes and were not particularly designed to injure the plaintiff
personally. In Katz v. Kapper," the defendants "called meetings of
the customers of plaintiff, threatened them that they would be driven
out of business and ruined if they continued to purchase fish from
plaintiff, but promised that if they purchased fish from defendants,
they would be given substantial reductions in price, so that they
could successfully compete with plaintiff and drive him out of bus-
iness; that if said customers continued to buy from plaintiff, the
22 Although we can agree with the Supreme Court that the boycott instituted by
the Fashion Originators' Guild was unlawful, our reasoning in arriving at that con-
clusion differs. See note 55.
23 There can be no doubt that, under the Hum v. Oursler doctrine, the federal
court had jurisdiction over the unfair competition charge, based upon the claim of
antitrust law violation which was "not plainly wanting in substance." Caldwell-
Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. Inc., 12 F.R.D. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
24 121 La. 658, 46 So. 685 (1908).
25 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935); Note, 9 So. Calif L. Rev. 425 (1936).
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defendants would open a retail store and would sell fish to the cus-
tomers of plaintiff's customers at such low prices that plaintiff's
customers would be driven out of business.... Defendants did open
such a store, did widely advertise and sell fish at lower prices than
either plaintiff or defendants could purchase the same, and at a loss
to the defendants."2 6 Although in Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co.,2 7 the
court conceded that an act, lawful in itself, may become unlawful by
reason of a malicious or wrongful motive, the opportunity to prove
wrongful motive in the Katz case was denied when defendants' de-
murrer was sustained.28
The defendant's conduct in these cases amounted to ruthless
warfare. Such attacks directed against competitors make a mockery
of the law of unfair competition and liken it to the law of the jungle.
There are cases, however, where an opposite result was reached,
although the competitive methods employed were no more odious or
excessive than in Katz v. Kapper2 9 In Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle,30
it was held "most assuredly unlawful to obstruct, harass, and annoy
appellee's employees when engaged in the discharge of their duties
in selling and distributing oils to appellee's customers; to threaten
customers of appellee to shut them up in their business if they con-
tinued to deal in appellee's oils." In Loyd Sabaudo v. Cubicciotti,31
the defendants were enjoined from threatening to withdraw their bus-
iness from the plaintiff's booking agents if they continued to sell the
latter's tickets. In Schonwald v. Ragains,32 the defendant threatened
that he and all other persons engaged in the same business would re-
fuse to sell to any person who purchased from plaintiff. The court,
in holding for plaintiff, made an excellent distinction between com-
petition by offering better quality or service and interference by
boycott.3 3 An interesting conflict of opinion is shown in Roseneau v.
26 Id. at 5, 44 P.2d at 1061.
27 152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911).
28 Id., "The fact that the methods used were ruthless, or unfair, in a moral sense,
does not stamp them as illegal. It has never been regarded as the duty or province of
the courts to regulate practices in the business world beyond the point of applying legal
or equitable remedies in cases involving acts of oppression or deceit which are unlawful.
Any extension of this jurisdiction must come through legislative action."
29 Supra note 25.
30 118 Ky. 662, 671, 82 S.W. 271, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 544 (1904).
31 159 Fed. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1908).
32 Schonwald v. Ragains, 32 Okla. 223, 122 P. 203 (1912).
33 Id. at 240. "They [defendants] did not sell their ice cheaper. They did not claim
to have a better grade or quality of ice. They did not offer better delivery facilities.
They did not offer any inducement by way of credits, or time, in payment of ac-
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Empire Circuit Co. 4 Plaintiff operated a burlesque theatre in Buffalo
and the defendant controlled the principal burlesque theatres in many
of the larger cities throughout the country. Defendant gave notice
that it would not book the production of any producer whose troupes
performed in theatres other than those owned or controlled by it. As
a result, about twenty producers cancelled their contracts with the
plaintiff, and the latter was unable to obtain presentable attractions
for its theatre. In reversing the lower court, the majority held that
defendant's method of doing business resulted in greater efficiency
and that its acts were not inspired by malice. The dissenting judge,
however, referred to the fact that defendants "repeatedly stated that
they intended to destroy the Court Street Theatre Co."; that "they
went at this scheme in a systematic manner"; that defendant com-
pany's managers "did maliciously single out the Court Street Theatre
Co. as the point of attack in order to destroy it," and that 'no such
warfare was carried on against other companies."35 In Binderup v.
Path6 Exchange,36 a theatre owner refused to purchase films from
certain distributors, whereupon the distributors induced his suppliers
to cease dealing with him. Plaintiff alleged that all had combined and
conspired to prevent him from carrying on his business by refusing
to furnish him with film service and by unlawfully cancelling unex-
pired contracts which he had with several suppliers. The destruction
of the plaintiff's business by force and attack would have been unlaw-
ful had each distributor acted individually or separately. The combin-
ation of the distributors, however, and their conspiracy to prevent
the plaintiff from dealing with any only served to accentuate the
severity of the unlawfulness. The court, in finding for plaintiff,
stressed that fact.37 In another case, however, the plaintiff was denied
relief, because he failed to show the existence of a conspiracy, "a
requisite of any boycott.
'38
counts. . .. Their sole and only excuse was that they enjoyed a monopoly of the ice
business... and that, unless the customers who had contracts with Ragains would
forthwith break and violate those contracts, they could not have or purchase any ice
from said defendants."
34 131 App. Div. 429, 115 N.Y.S. 511 (1909), motion to amend decision denied,
132 App. Div. 947, 117 N.Y.S. 1146 (1909).
35 Pages 438, 442. See also Peekskill Theatre v. Advance Theatrical Co., 206
App. Div. 138, 200 N.Y.S. 726 (1923), where officers of Loew's, who were interested
in a rival theatre, made efforts to ruin the Peekskill Theatre Company by inducing
distributors to break their contracts and refuse to deal with it. Injunction granted.
36 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
37 See also, Sultan v. Star Co., 106 Misc. 43, 174 N.Y.S. 52 (1919).
38 McNeil v. Hall, 220 N.C. 73, 16 S.E. 456 (1941); adversely criticized in Note,
40 Mich. L. Rev. 1273 (1942); See also, Note, 30 Geo. LJ. 319 (1942).
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II.
The present state of the law is characterized by confusion; it
may be said to be in the "chrysalis stage" and anything but uniform.
The general statement that the courts, in boycott cases, usually con-
sider the object sought and the means used is not entirely correct.3 9
There are at least three rules which influence the courts: (1) The
ordinary tort rule, under which the boycott is prima facie a tort and
the defendant is liable unless he can justify his act. "The wilful
causing of damage to another by a positive act, whether by one man
alone, or by several acting in concert, and whether by direct action
against him or indirectly by inducing a third person to exercise a
lawful right, is a tort unless there were just cause for inflicting the
damage."40 Malice, i.e., the instigation of an injurious act out of
sheer ill-will, tips the scales against the defendant and relieves the
courts of the delicate task of weighing the equities of the parties.
Concerted action, however, is permissible where the court finds that
the purposes and objectives of the combine are unobjectionable. (2)
The conspiracy rule, under which the secondary boycott is unlawful
solely because of the element of combination.41 "An act harmless when
39 "A boycott is commonly understood by the people and is generally spoken of in
the law as an unlawful thing, and this, because the ordinary trade boycott of large
bodies of men, is usually accompanied by acts of violence, threats, or intimidation; but
I think it clear that under this definition, which seems to cover all the elements of a
boycott, there may be a lawful as well as an unlawful boycott, depending on the
purpose and intention with which the boycott is inaugurated, the means and methods
employed, and the ends intended to be accomplished by its existence" (Emphasis added).
Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Board of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 784, 224 S.V.
451 (1920).
40 Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of
the Actor, Lectures on Legal History 399 (1913).
41 It has been said that "no branch of the law seems less clear than that of
-conspiracy. At common law there was a writ of conspiracy now obsolete, dealing
with treason and felonies. A later development resulted in an action on the case in
the nature of conspiracy for the damage caused to plaintiff." Keviczky v. Lorber, 290
N.Y. 297, 305, 49 N.E.2d 146 (1943). The essentials of a conspiracy are commonly
described as follows: It is "A combination of two or more persons, by concerted action,
to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal
or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means." Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S.
197 (1893). It has also been called a "partnership in criminal purposes brought about
by an agreement." United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910), reversing, 173
Fed. 823 (1909); Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 631 (6th Cir. 1915), cert.
denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915). In fact, the term conspiracy, by itself, means nothing.
Its essence is the tort which motivates it. Therefore, it has been properly held that
"where conduct is tortious in itself allegations that it was committed pursuant to a
conspiracy add nothing to the complaint, although conduct otherwise innocent may
sometimes become actionable if done in concert." Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet
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done by one may become a public wrong when done by many, acting
in concert, for it then takes on the form of conspiracy, and may be
prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful to the public, or to the
individual against whom the concerted action is directed. ' 42 The
rigidity of this rule precludes consideration of economic interests or
the equities involved.4 3 (3) The antitrust law rule, under which a boy-
cott is illegal if it violates the spirit or the letter of federal or state
antitrust legislation. Here confusion reigns, for the conspiracy rule
has been further confounded by the monopoly aspect. The existence
of a combination has so fascinated the courts that they have given
little or no attention to the nature of the combination unless compelled
to do so by the "rule of reason." The antitrust law approach, which
is rooted in the comon-law principle that "no man could be prohibited
from working in any lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness, the
mother of all evil,"144 may well apply to a boycott used as a device for
preventing others from becoming competitors; the antitrust law rule
is a salutary supplement to the competitive aspect, for it prevents the
courts from ignoring the disparity of economic power. Where the
object of the combination is unlawful under the antitrust laws, the
unlawfulness of the boycott need not be further considered.
Criticism has been justifiably levelled at the fact45 that the courts
have, by and large, failed to give proper consideration to the rela-
tionship between the parties. This relationship is as important a con-
sideration and as deserving of attention as the means used and
objects sought. The fact that the courts and textwriters have contin-
uously failed to analyze them has caused the confusion in the cases.
On the other hand, it is an oversimplification of the problem to con-
sider secondary boycott, unlawful in the bargaining struggle and law-
ful in the competitive struggle.4 6 A guiding rule might be found,
however, in the rules of the competitive order of struggle.
Theater, 113 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943); Restatement, Torts, §§ 765, 775; or that "the
allegation and proof of a conspiracy in an action of this character [fraud] is only
important to connect a defendant with the transaction and to charge him with the
acts and declarations of his conspirators, where otherwise he could not have been
implicated." Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454, 20 N.E. 376 (1889); Green v.
Davies, 182 N.Y. 499, 75 N.E. 536 (1905).
42 Granada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440 (1910), affirming 95
Miss. 337, 48 So. 1021, 35 R.LA. (N.S.) 1054 (1909). For conspiracy within the
same enterprise, see United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173
F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
43 For other objections to this theory, see Annot. 6 A.L.R. 909, 911 (1920).
44 Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614).
45 Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 478 (1923).
46 Ibid. See also Handler, "Unfair Competition," 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 208 (1936);
warning against the application of any rigid and inflexible rule in this connection.
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III.
The nature of the competitive order was suggested by this author
some 20 years ago." Basically there are two divisions of the order
of life: ordinary life, which imports an order of peace, and business
life, for which the field of competition is the arena for conflict, which
imports an order of struggle. In ordinary life conflict arises from
real or apparent injury; in the competitive life it is the very essence
of the competitive relationship. In ordinary life restoring peace means
restoring order; in competitive life peace necessarily suggests a vio-
lation of the antitrust laws! Struggle is in the nature of things in-
cidental to competitive activity. There is no other motive than the
obtention of the prize, and there is no chance of obtaining peaceful
conditions so long as competition continues. In the field of compe-
tition struggle is natural and essential, and rules of law should be
designed to regulate the contest. It is typical of the order of struggle
that a competitor is permitted to injure his rivals in trade; the wrong
stems out of a violation of the rules prescribed for the fair contest.
Which tort the wrongful act commits depends upon which rules of
struggle are recognized.
What are the rules in the law of unfair competition? Competition
has been defined as "the act or proceeding for something that is sought
by another at the same time; or contention of two or more for the
same object or for superiority, rivalry, as between aspirants for
honors, or for advantage in business. 48 This concept of competition
is too broad. This is apparent when examined in a field entirely
divorced from business life-in the field of sports. To understand
it properly, "Competition resembles a race rather than a fight, for
in a fight it is quite proper to 'knock out' your opponent; but tripping
your rival in a race is regarded as bad sportsmanship. 49
Again, starting with the fundamental concept of competition and
then attempting to transfer its general terms into the language of
business life, it must be realized that there is a definite distinction
between the principles motivating the struggle of rivals in sports and
those in commerce. A game is but a single occurrence; what happens
to its participants after the event has no bearing upon the contest.
The winner may celebrate his success or he may collapse; he has ac-
tomplished what he set out to do. Competition in business, however,
47 "What is Unfair Competition?" 28 Geo. LJ. 585 (1940); see also, Callmann,
The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks, § 6 (2d ed. 1950 with Supp. 1961).
48 Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Baldwin's Ed. 1934).
49 Ross, Principle of Sociology (1930), 166. Also McLaughlin, "Legal Control of
Competitive Methods," 21 Iowa L. Rev. 274, 280: "It is possible to distinguish between
a competitive race and a competitive fight."
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has a continuing appeal. Because competition has the function of
economic organization it is not realistic to consider it in the sense of
isolated transactions. Every separate commercial transaction has an
effect upon the enterprise as a whole, and this will be manifest in
the success of an enterprise. It may be said that this net effect is
the prize of competition; the customer seems to be only a means to
the end, more exposed to view than all, but ultimately the seller,
buyer, banker, newspaper and advertising agency are also of great
importance. Actually, an important distinction exists. It is the main
function of a business enterprise to sell its product. Financing, ad-
vertising, and similar transactions, although necessary, are merely
auxiliary. Thus, the decision of the customer is the most important
event. Each bargain is a contest with the conquest of the customer
the goal; he is the umpire of the game, his comparison decides the
issue, and his favor is sought by all who seek to sell him their wares.
This line of reasoning leads to a distinction which should be the
pole-star in the law of "unfair competition," i.e., the distinction be-
tween competition characterized by constructive effort and that
characterized by nonconstructive effort. The former will always be
allowed, for constructive competition is not unlawful. The latter,
however, should fundamentally be taboo.
"Constructive effort" is the effort of one who seeks a commercial
advantage through the honestly exercised means of his own strength,
ingenuity, skill and capital." Constructive effort is a subjective con-
cept; the business man's effort is constructive, not because his act is
beneficial to the general economy from an objective point of view,
especially not because he considers his competitive effort beneficial to
the whole, but because in his business activity he makes use of those
powers which are reasonably necessary to do the best possible job
within his ability.
The maxims of competitive equity can be drawn only from the
peculiar character of the particular "game competition." 51 In the
competitive contest, constructive effort is the basic and permissible
weapon. It is not a struggle of one competitor against the other but
of all with the others for a common prize. The customer is in the
role of umpire, and competitors should invite his patronage by afford-
ing him the opportunity to judge freely the quality, price and service
50 The classical expression of constructive effort may be found in the Homeric
Words: "Be ever best and o'ertop other men." This is the advice given by two fathers
to their sons who were leaving for war; it is the unsurpassable exposition of the ideal
in an age of sportsmanlike fighting.
51 See Callmann, op. cit. supra note 47, at p. 136.
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each offers, as the product of his own effort and skill without any
violation of non-competitive legal obligations.
IV.
Why is the boycott in the Kor's case (usually called a secondary
boycott because it entails an attempt to induce others to avoid dealing
with the victim), and the defamation in the Oilburner case unlawful?
Why are they "unfair competition?" Because they both involve direct
attacks upon a competitor. A direct attack is a fight "against" and
not a struggle "with" a competitor and this markedly differs from
constructive effort. It is "unfair" because in "fair" competition the
loser is only beaten in such a manner as is necessary to permit the
customer to give the winner his patronage.5 2 The direct attack, how-
ever, is executed by act or word and may mention the competitor by
name or innuendo. The dangerous implications of this type of attack
are not yet generally recognized. 3 In many cases it merely serves as
a welcome substitute for such concepts as "malice," "purpose of in-juring a competitor" or "intent to drive a competitor out of busi-
ness.75 4
The Fashion Guild case55 highlights the error of condemning all
boycotts as antitrust law violations. True, the Court there properly
chastized the association for a number of organizational measures
used to discipline its members; there was, moreover, an obvious
restraint of trade within the meaning of the antitrust laws. The boy-
cott, however, was something quite different; it was a kind of self-
defense against a practice, design-piracy, which was, and still is,
considered unfair competition by the majority of those who do not
indulge in it. The members of the trade who instituted the boycott
acted in good faith and were the proponents of the purer ethic. It
52 "Competition consists in trying to do things better than someone else; that is,
making or selling a better article at a lesser cost, or otherwise giving better service.
It is not competition to resort to methods of the prize ring, and simply 'knock the
other man out.' That is killing the competitor." Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition,
American Legal News, Vol. 44, January 1913, quoted in Mason, A Case Study in the
Working of Democracy, Princeton University Press, esp. Chap. III, p. 72 (1938).
53 In American Steel Co. v. American Steel & Wire Co., 244 Fed. 300 (Mass.
1916), the varied attacks by which the defendant sought to drive competitors with
whom he was unable to come to terms out of business were considered under the
antitrust laws.
54 Direct attacks against a competitor can also be based upon disparagement
of one's rival and/or his goods ("business libel") or abuse of litigation for the purpose
of harrassing, a competitor and/or his customers.
55 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S.
457, 463 (1941).
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seems highly improbable that anyone even thought that the boycott
would lead to a monopoly. But self-defense or self-help is a privilege
premised upon the concept that one who is the target of attack is
entitled to take reasonable defensive action to avert immediate injury
when there is no time to resort to law. This principle must be adopted
by, and adapted to, the law of unfair competition. That means:
"The proper forum for the trial of legal controversies is the court."'56
Self-help should only be sanctioned when belated judicial aid would
be academic or otherwise prove ineffectual. So long as the courts re-
main unwilling to declare a practice unfair competition, private groups
cannot resort to such drastic means as a boycott because of an act
which the victim of the boycott would be entitled to consider lawful.
If the courts would condemn certain acts as unlawful, a preliminary
injunction would, of course, be preferable to self-help.
V.
The parallel between boycott and price war is illuminating. The
most popular weapons in a price war are sales below cost and price
discrimination. Under the statutes, a sale below cost is unlawful
only if effected for the purpose of "injuring a competitor or destroying
competition." "Selling below cost" usually begins in selling below the
prices of a competitor and if the latter is adamant it goes on until
the price is below cost. Do phrases such as "intent to destroy com-
petition" or "create a monopoly" add anything of value to the phase
"to injure a competitor?" An affirmative answer is indicated. Driving
a competitor out of business can be one means of realizing monopo-
listic ambitions, and if the aggressor who declares and wages the
price war is powerful enough to dominate the field there can be no
doubt that we can properly label his activity "selling below cost with
the intent to lessen competition or create a monopoly." In principle,
a price war is possible without this illegal intent, for the war may
be between two competitors who, themselves, are in competition with
many others. In such a case, selling below cost would be unlawful
only as unfair competition or only because it is intended "to injure
a specific competitor," i.e., to drive him out of business; here there
is no violation of the antitrust laws nor is there any evidence of an
"intent to lessen competition" or "create a monopoly." The gravamen
of the complaint is the unfair attack upon a competitor.
56 Johnson Laboratories v. Meissner Mfg. Co., 98 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1938); A. B.
Farquhar Co. v. National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714, 49 L.R.A. 755 (3d Cir. 1900);
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of California v. Avis, 25 F.2d 303 (D. N. Ill. 1928); Maytag
Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (1929), cert. den., 281 U.S. 737 (7th Cir. 1930).
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The same distinction can be found in the Robinson-Patman Act."
This act defines three kinds of price discrimination: (1) general price
discrimination in price, service and facilities the effect of which may
be "substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly"
or "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition"; (2) geographical
price discrimination; and (3) selling "at unreasonably low prices for
the purposes of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
The first category is declared unlawful in section 1 of the Act, which
amended section 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. The other categories
are declared unlawful in section 3 of the Act and this section pre-
scribes penal sanctions only. The Supreme Court 5 held that section 3
does not create a private cause of action, because it is an independent
criminal provision while section 1, like section 2 of the Clayton Act,
is an antitrust law and therefore gives rise to the remedies provided by
the Act.59 To the extent that the Court denied that a criminal law
may give rise to a civil cause of action, its decision is questionable.6"
Nor is it clear why the types of price discrimination outlawed by sec-
tion 3 differ in character from those proscribed by the amended sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act; there is, no doubt, "a partial overlap"61
between both sections. Price discrimination of the section 3 variety,
maintained "for the purpose of destroying competition," has the same
result as the discrimination forbidden by the antitrust laws. In de-
termining whether a particular provision is an "antitrust law" the test
is not whether it is physically incorporated in another law which is an
antitrust law but whether it is directed against the same offenses, i.e.,
against acts which "restrain trade," "substantially lessen compe-
tition," "create a monopoly," or "injure, destroy or prevent com-
petition." To the extent that section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act
(or, for that matter, any other law) is designed to prevent the "elim-
ination of a competitor," it is also a law against unfair competition.
Like a boycott, a price war imports aggression. It constitutes a di-
rect attack upon a competitor and is avowedly designed to drive him
out of business by concentrating the power of superior economic
strength against him. Price-cutting is a common incident of marketing;
price discrimination, however, is selling at unreasonably low prices or
57 49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C. 13 (1936); an act to amend section 2 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 12 (1914).
58 Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1948); Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Vance, Trustee in Bankruptcy, 355 U.S. 389 (1958).
59 Clayton Act §§ 14 and 16.
60 See Callmann treatise, op. cit. supra note 47, Supp. 1961 to p. 558, n. 29.
61 See 355 U.S. at 378.
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below cost, and characterizes the cutthroat competition that follows
the declaration of a price war. 2
Lawyers and judges can never do full justice to the facts of a
case unless they have a clear notion about the law which should
govern it. It is important, therefore, that a distinction be recognized
between a law directed at regulation of business, a law intended to
prevent monopolistic developments, and a law which merely pro-
scribes unfair competition. This distinction determines what kind of
tort a boycott or price war would be in a special situation. Labelling
all boycotts as monopolistic, even though it presents a convenient
peg on which to hang the rationale of a particular holding, can distort
the development of the law. A boycott can, of course, involve a con-
spiracy for monopolistic purposes and then again it can also be a
combination arising out of a "private quarrel." Price discrimination
intended to favor the large purchaser to the prejudice of his smaller
rivals is a typical example of an antitrust violation. The seller's
competitors are only incidentally prejudiced. Price discrimination di-
rected at driving a competitor out of business is primarily unfair
competition and may incidentally result in monopoly.
A recent Court of Appeals63 opinion indicates that a certain trend
has already taken hold. In that case, the facts clearly established that
defendants intended to destroy the plaintiff-competitor by pros-
elyting its key employees, appropriating of its trade secrets, using
false financial statements with respect to its condition, interfering
with its source of raw materials, disturbing its employees, and in-
ducing its employees to breach their fiduciary relationships. Although
all of the practices could have properly been condemned as unfair
competition, the Court referred to the Kor's case and in "viewing the
conspiracy alleged in the instant case" held that "the purpose of de-
62 For a price war case, where the court was divested by artificial and irrelevant
antitrust considerations, see Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1994).
There, defendant, in the course of a bitter price war directed against plaintiff's
local business, maintained prices in its interstate transactions but cut prices in its
intrastate transactions in plaintiff's locality, expressly for the purpose of driving
plaintiff out of business. See also Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co.,
153 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Bowman Dairy Co. v. Hedlin Dairy Co., 126
F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1954); Babcock v. Crafts 20 Big Shows, Inc., 342 P.2d 974
(Cal. App. 1959); Cf., also Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern Railroad Presidents'
Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd in other respects in Eastern Rail-
road Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961), in which the
acts of unfair competition were so patent that the distinction between the antitrust
laws should have been highlighted.
63 Atlantic Heel Co., Inc. v. Allied Heel Co., Inc., 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960).
See also, Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1960),
aff'd, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961).
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stroying a competitor by means that are not within the area of fair
and honest competition is a purpose that clearly subverts the goal of
the Sherman Act. It constitutes an interference with the natural flow
of interstate commerce which would exist under conditions of fair
and honest rivalry for the buyer's trade."
The Klor's case may indicate that a kind of federal law of unfair
competition is in gestation; however, the confusion in legal concepts
suggests that paternity is not the common law of unfair competition
but of the antitrust laws. Desirable as a federal law of unfair com-
petition may be,64 it would be more dignified to create it by act of
Congress or even an "overt act" of the courts than by misinterpreta-
tion of existing statutes.
64 See H. R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (Lindsay Bill).
